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Introduction 
 
Central Asia is a region that lacks meaningful regional institutions, has 
a weak regional identity, and is beset by a complex litany of political, 
economic, and social divisions, both within and between states. 
Tensions among Central Asian states over borders, resources, and 
security, combined with deep political and social cleavages within 
states and geopolitical competition across the wider region all support 
a view of Central Asia as a prime example of the concept of regional 
fracture. However, while acknowledging the significance of these 
underlying fractures, in this chapter I suggest a more complex, 
multilevel reading of regional interactions in which a focus on the role 
of shared ideas, norms, and beliefs provides a framework for some 
limited regional cooperation within a common discourse that is sharply 
at odds with the liberal norms that underpin most Western theories of 
regionalism. The result is a form of “illiberal regionalism,” which does 
not offer a resolution of fundamental fractures within and between 
societies but often provides an effective means to suppress their 
political articulation.  
 
Central Asia: A Fractured Region 
 
Academic and policy analysis of the Central Asian region has long 
stressed its potential instability and its fundamentally fractured nature 
(Lewis 2008; Cummings 2012; Cooley 2012), so much so that critics 
have warned against framing the region solely through “discourses of 
danger,” external narratives that exaggerate security threats and 
characterize the region as dominated by Islamist militancy, organized 
crime, and terrorism (Heathershaw and Megoran 2011). Nevertheless, 
the region clearly faces severe political and social tensions, including 
interstate conflicts over resources, water, and borders; intrastate 
clashes between authoritarian states and restive societies; Islamist 
movements challenging secular states; and geopolitical tensions 
between Russia, China, and the West. Against this backdrop, studies 
of regionalism in Central Asia have tended to answer the ontological 
question of “what we study when we study regionalism” (Hettne 2005, 
543) by highlighting the failures of regional projects and the underlying 
divisions among states, often dismissing regional organizations as 
“virtual” or ineffective (Allison 2008; Collins 2012). Studies of Central 
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Asian regionalism have stressed the failure of Central Asian states to 
develop their own regional organizations and have highlighted the 
continuing role of extra-regional powers in determining the region’s 
politics and security (Allison 2004; Bohr 2004; Collins 2009; Cooley 
2012). Instead of regionalization—“an active process of change 
towards increased cooperation, integration, convergence, coherence 
and identity” (Allison 2004, 465)—Central Asian societies became 
increasingly estranged from each other while their political leaderships 
united only for brief political summits under the hegemonic tutelage 
of Russia or China. Although external powers frequently initiated new 
regional initiatives, they were often ineffective or reinforced the very 
fractures they were intended to overcome. The result of this 
breakdown in regional cooperation has been repeatedly identified as 
imposing heavy social and economic costs on the region (Collins 
2009).  
The conventional portrayal of Central Asia as a fractured 
region begins with definitions. Constructivist approaches to the 
regionalism debate have argued that regions are not predefined entities 
with clear boundaries but are constructed and deconstructed through 
discourse, social and economic interaction, and political practice 
(Hettne 2005; Söderbaum and Shaw 2003; Emerson 2014; Godement 
2014; Hettne and Söderbaum 2000; Söderbaum 2016). Regions are 
made and unmade through discursive mechanisms and political 
practices. Guy Emerson (2014, 560) argues that “the multiple 
discourses of regionalism, regional identity and the process of region 
building itself, are constantly being re-defined, with its boundaries and 
identifying structures the products of continual struggle and therefore 
reappraisal.” Earlier constructivist thought tended to view this process 
of “imagining” the region as a move that might help to transcend the 
nation-state and contribute to the development of new, regional 
identities (Adler 1997), but in many postcolonial contexts it is historical 
experience and common memory that underlies the idea of the region, 
rather than any common hope for future regional integration. This is 
certainly the case in Central Asia, where the identification of Central 
Asia as a region—and therefore a space that is thought by policymakers 
to require institutionalized cross-boundary cooperation in a form of 
regional integration—stems above all from a common historical 
experience and a process of colonial demarcation. 
Although the term “Central Asia” is now commonly used in 
English to portray the five post-Soviet states of Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, there are many 
Central Asia: Fractured Region, Illiberal Regionalism 
 
4 
 
alternative ways to label these territories as a regional entity. 
Definitions that highlight ethnic and cultural distinctions from the two 
major civilizations to the north and the east—Russia and China—may 
include Xinjiang, parts of southern Siberia inhabited by Turkic peoples, 
Mongolia, and Tibet, in a world sometimes termed “Inner Asia.” 
Soviet-era definitions, on the other hand, used the term “Srednaya 
aziya” (Middle Asia) to cover only the Tajik, Uzbek, Kyrgyz, and 
Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republics, but excluded the Kazakh SSR, 
reflecting a different colonial history and asserting a closer relationship 
between Kazakhstan and Russia than with the other Central Asian 
republics. Since 1991 the term “Eurasia” has been widely used in 
Russia and Kazakhstan to define a more ambiguous region, sometimes 
encompassing not only Russia and Central Asia but also other former 
Soviet republics (Laruelle 2008; Gleason 2010). A more expansive 
notion of “Greater Eurasia” developed by some Russian intellectuals 
covers much of the continent, including China, Russia, India, Central 
Asia, and Iran, and has a clear geopolitical agenda to construct a 
counterbalance to US power (Karaganov 2016). By contrast, another 
geopolitical construct, the idea of “Greater Central Asia” sought to 
disconnect Central Asia from Russia and instead reconnect it to 
Xinjiang, Mongolia, and Afghanistan in alignment with broader US 
strategy in the region (Starr 2005).    
These diverse geographic labels highlight the extent to which 
social constructedness of regions always emerges from a particular 
interpretation of history. The current conventional definition of 
Central Asia derives from frontiers drawn during the period of 
expansion by imperial powers into the region in the nineteenth and 
twentieth century. The legacies of imperial history are evident in the 
most significant geopolitical line of fracture across the region, the 
frontier of Afghanistan along the Amu Darya river, the faultline 
introduced in the nineteenth century by Russia and Britain, which 
carved out Afghanistan as a buffer state between the two expanding 
Asian empires. Russia’s rapid nineteenth-century expansion across 
Central Asia determined the political content and the boundaries of 
the region to both south and east for the next 150 years. China’s 
influence in Inner Asia diminished sharply after 1911 but was 
reasserted in Xinjiang, Tibet, and Inner Mongolia after 1949 (Siegel 
2002; Forbes 1986; Frankopan 2015). Soviet border policy, 
compounded by Sino-Soviet tensions after the 1960s, further hardened 
these borders and divided the region from historic trade routes and 
cultural ties to the rest of Asia. Imperialism defined the boundaries of 
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the present-day region but also informed the metaphor of the “Great 
Game,” the Russo-British struggle for influence in the region, which 
continues to be used as a discursive frame to assert the fractured nature 
of international relations in the region (Morgan 1973; Becker 2012; 
Yapp 2001).  
A second historical fracture within the region stems from the 
Soviet process of national territorial delimitation, the creation of the 
titular Soviet republics that form the basis of today’s five nation-states: 
Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. 
Based on Soviet thinking about nationality—defined as a coherent 
ethnic group with its own territory—Soviet ethnographers and officials 
divided the region known in the late Tsarist period as Turkestan, which 
was populated by a very heterogeneous population in terms of 
ethnicity, language, way of life, and identity, into new territorial 
formations defined on the basis of a dominant titular nationality. The 
Soviet state prioritized national identities for a population that had 
largely self-identified through other categories, whether religious, 
tribal, nomadic, or settled, rather than the nationality categories to 
which they were now ascribed (Hirsch 2000, 2005; Edgar 2006). 
Passportization formalized these new divisions and institutionalized 
them in bureaucratic structures and symbolic representation.  
Although Soviet delimitation policy is sometimes described as 
facilitating Moscow’s “divide and rule,” this account is misleading 
(Hirsch 2000). Border delimitation was based on ethnographic and 
demographic information, influenced by local political disputes and 
economic viability rather than attempting to maintain the logic of 
colonial rule. Nevertheless, there was certainly no exact fit between 
administrative boundaries and ethnic identity in the Soviet republics. 
Uzbek ethnicity, in particular, spills over into neighboring states. 
Uzbek communities in neighboring Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, 
Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan cause anxieties of national identity in 
those countries (Fumagalli 2007). Disputes between ethnic Uzbeks and 
ethnic Kyrgyz over resources, status, and identity fueled interethnic 
conflict in southern Kyrgyzstan in 1990, and again in June 2010, when 
hundreds died in violent clashes. Soviet policy also encouraged large-
scale migration by Russians and Russian speakers into Central Asia, 
particularly into Kazakhstan and major cities, such as Tashkent. This 
influx was partially reversed by an outflow of Russian speakers, 
primarily to the Russian Federation, in the 1990s. Nevertheless, 
Russian-speakers still form sizable minorities in Kazakhstan and 
Kyrgyzstan. In Kazakhstan, the Russian-speaking minority is largely 
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resident in northern regions of the country that some Russian 
nationalists claim as Russian territory. Other diasporas—Soviet 
Koreans in Uzbekistan or Chechens in Kazakhstan—are the legacy of 
Soviet-era forced resettlement programs but have had a lasting impact 
on societies in the region. 
Regional loyalties formed another set of cleavages inside states. 
After independence Kazakhstan periodically faced centrifugal forces 
from its northern provinces while oil-producing Western Kazakhstan 
occasionally proved restive, dissatisfied with the division of benefits 
with central elites (Cummings 2000). President Nursultan Nazarbayev 
shifted the capital to the new city of Astana, primarily to assert a new 
spatial identity for the nation and to overcome regional fracturing 
(Wolfel 2002). In Kyrgyzstan, a traditional north–south divide is often 
characterized as dividing the Kyrgyz nation along cultural, religious, 
and political lines. In reality, other internal fractures—among southern 
local elites, or between rural and urban areas—are often just as salient 
(Lewis 2008). Tajikistan’s strong regional identities—and forms of 
political economy associated with different regions—contributed to 
the civil war that the country experienced in the 1990s. The 
traditionally dominant northern region of Sughd was sidelined as the 
southern regions around Kulyab challenged eastern regions for 
political and economic power in the new state (Heathershaw 2009). In 
Uzbekistan, political struggles were also often characterized as being 
among regional elites, with Tashkent and Samarkand groupings 
dominant for much of the post-Soviet period while elites from Fergana 
and other regions were marginalized (Collins, 2006). 
Formally coherent states were also challenged by the informal 
social structures that asserted alternative spatial imaginaries, 
challenging the reach of central governments and creating alternative 
regional networks not dependent on formal interstate relations. 
Informal social and political networks were formed through genuine 
and fictive kinship networks and through mutual relations developed 
through business, informal institutions, and political activism (Collins 
2006; Schatz 2004; Tuncer-Kilavuz 2009). In some cases, underlying 
historical clans played a role. In Kazakhstan, for example, three broad 
historical clans in Kazakh society, known as zhus or horde, and various 
subclans appeared to reinforce fractures within the Kazakh nation 
(Schatz 2004; Junisbai 2009). In many cases, however, substantive 
political and business networks developed based on long-standing 
financial, educational, or institutional connections, and these formed 
both within states and across borders. These networks acted as 
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patron–client systems in which relations of trust and mutual support 
operate vertically, culminating in a particular patron at the top of a 
pyramid-type structure (Hale 2015; Radnitz 2010). Although often 
viewed as weakening the state, in some cases informal networks and 
patron–client systems functioned in ways that strengthened formally 
weak post-Soviet states (Lewis 2017). In a similar way, at a regional 
level, informal networks of political, business, and security elites 
ensured that some types of regional linkages were maintained even 
when formal state-to-state relations were weak or dysfunctional. 
Kathleen Collins (2006) argues that neopatrimonial, authoritarian 
regimes are resistant to economic regionalism because it often requires 
liberal reforms that might undermine their domestic political position. 
However, the informal networks that constitute these states can form 
transboundary networks in ways that mitigate the lack of formal 
cooperation. Organized criminal networks—allied with state 
institutions or powerful political elites—manage effective trade 
corridors in illicit goods across the region, including opiates smuggled 
from Afghanistan (Lewis 2014). Smaller-scale smuggling routes were 
frequently able to ensure that cross-border trade networks continued 
to function even in situations where cross-border movement was 
formally halted. Security and intelligence services often maintained 
informal links, even when political relations between states were poor.  
These historical, ethnic, and social cleavages contributed to a 
crisis of sovereignty for the post-Soviet Central Asian state. In 
response, state-led nation-building programs promoted a national 
identity that often denied underlying ethnic differences. Attempts to 
develop a singular national Uzbek identity, for example, occluded 
alternative identities, such as the Tajik cultural roots of many residents 
of Samarkand. Similarly, the Tajik nation-building process was 
impatient with diverse regional and ethnic identities across Tajikistan: 
The central government repeatedly intervened to suppress aspirations 
of autonomy among the Ismaili people of Gorno-Badakhshan in 
Eastern Tajikistan. They had formed part of the opposition during the 
1990s civil war and subsequently faced military interventions in 2012 
and 2014 to suppress “warlords” who often received significant local 
support. Almost inevitably, this imposition of narrow nationalism at 
home also involved the identification of enemies abroad. 
Governments often presented the wider region as a source of danger, 
not as an opportunity for peaceful cross-border trade and social 
interaction. In Uzbekistan, President Islam Karimov argued, 
“Uzbekistan is encircled by countries burdened with ethnic, 
Central Asia: Fractured Region, Illiberal Regionalism 
 
8 
 
demographic, economic and other problems” (cited in Megoran 2005, 
561–62). As a result, according to Nick Megoran, “the 1990s thus 
witnessed a marked shift in Karimov’s sense of the geopolitical identity 
of Uzbekistan, from a self-confident polity at peace with itself and its 
neighbours to a besieged island of civilisation in a sea of anarchy that 
threatened to submerge it” (Megoran 2005, 562). All countries in the 
region used the experience of Afghanistan as an external threat to 
demonstrate the need to heighten internal security and as legitimation 
for authoritarian practices. The Kazakh and Uzbek authorities 
frequently pointed to political and social unrest in their neighbors, 
Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, as examples of the dangers of liberalization 
and Islamist radicalism, and often viewed regionalism through a 
pathological lens that saw cooperation as permitting the infection of 
political instability to spread across boundaries.  
These anxieties over sovereignty and security partly explain the 
difficult interstate relations experienced in the region during the first 
twenty-five years of post-Soviet independence. Processes of border 
delimitation were often strongly contested and in some cases remained 
uncompleted more than twenty-five years after the collapse of the 
USSR. At least until the death of President Karimov in 2016, 
Uzbekistan had poor relations with all its neighbors, intervening in the 
civil war in Tajikistan in the late 1990s; launching military raids against 
guerrilla forces in southern Kyrgyzstan in 1999; and imposing severe 
constraints on cross-border trade and travel with Kyrgyzstan and 
Tajikistan. Uzbekistan’s autarkic economic policy of import 
substitution further accentuated border disputes, limiting intraregional 
trade, people-to-people contacts, and transport links across the region. 
As a result, Central Asia became one of the least integrated and trade-
friendly regions in the world (Cooley 2012). Traveling across borders 
was often accompanied by tales of harassment, bribery, corruption, 
and violence. While external powers promoted visions of connectivity 
and regional trade, the realities of borders in the region became very 
different (Reeves 2015). Frontiers remained nodes of extreme tension 
rather than exchange. The Uzbek–Kyrgyz and Uzbek–Tajik borders 
were heavily mined and fortified and were often closed to travel and 
trade. Shootings were common. In May 2015 twenty-two-year-old 
Mansur Makhmudjon Uulu was shot dead when he attempted to cross 
the Kyrgyz–Uzbek border with potatoes and apricots to sell (Putz 
2015b). Uzbek border guards shot dead thirty-six-year-old Kazakh 
Ualikhan Akhmetov, the father of seven children, when he went out 
fishing on the Syr Darya river (Putz 2015a). These everyday 
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geopolitical tragedies are stark reminders of the fundamentally 
fractured nature of the region.  
 
<A>Regional Identity and External Hegemony</> 
The emphasis on national sovereignty and the construction of 
postcolonial national identities undermined the development of a 
coherent regional identity. Uzbekistan, for example, which might have 
assumed the role of regional leader, became an internally focused 
autarkic state, reluctant to become involved in regional initiatives that 
might challenge its policies of hard borders and ultrasovereignty. 
Turkmenistan followed an even more extreme course of self-isolation 
under the rhetorical protection of a policy of neutrality. Both states 
pursued active policies of exclusionary nation building, focusing on 
Uzbek and Turkmen identity to the detriment of any supranational 
loyalties. Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan were all open—to 
varying degrees—to other modes of regional cooperation, but, without 
Uzbekistan’s involvement, there was only limited capacity to develop 
any genuine regional cooperation. In 2016–17 there were initial signs 
of a new regional policy emerging in Tashkent, which pursued 
improved relations with its neighbors and sought to revive trade links 
within the region, but progress remained slow.  
A lack of top-down regional integration, or what has been 
dubbed “Old Regionalism” (Hettne 2005; Söderbaum 2016), was 
accompanied by a lack of any indicators of what scholars identified as 
“new regionalism,” defined as “a range of formal/informal mid-level 
‘triangular’ relations among not only states but also non-state actors, 
notably civil societies and private companies” (Söderbaum and Shaw 
2003, 1). New regionalism acknowledged the significance of regional 
activity in the fields of culture, education, private business, and civil 
society, with nonstate actors complementing regional organizations 
and states. It also viewed new regional initiatives as more open to 
globalization and less likely to be influenced by hegemonic powers in 
determining a sense of “regionness” (Söderbaum and Shaw 2003; 
Söderbaum 2016). Very few of these attributes of new regionalism 
could be easily identified in Central Asia. There were almost no 
regional civil society organizations, business associations, or 
educational networks, with the exception of those that were externally 
funded and designed. There was some bilateral trade between 
countries in the region, but for all countries the main trade links were 
with extraregional partners—namely, China, Russia, and the EU. 
Labor migration also had some regional aspects, with both Kyrgyz 
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skilled workers and many Uzbek laborers working in agriculture or 
trade in Kazakhstan. However, these intraregional flows were 
outpaced by migration to extraregional states in ways that undermined 
rather than strengthened a sense of Central Asian regional space. As 
many as 1 million Kyrgyz, 1.5 million Tajiks and more than 3 million 
Uzbek citizens worked as labor migrants in Russia, producing 
alternative spatial imaginaries constituted by new patterns of 
settlement and migration. These “bottom-up” flows tended to 
reinforce hegemonic concepts of regionalism, in which external actors 
played leading roles in defining the region and shaping regional norms 
and institutions.  
 
External Powers and Hegemonic Regionalism 
 
In a further distinction from the new regionalism literature, which 
presumed an end to hegemon-led forms of regionalism in the post–
Cold War world, Central Asia has been distinguished by multiple 
efforts to overcome regional fractures and to induce regional 
cooperation through externally led regional institutions (Cooley 2012; 
Lewis 2015). Indeed, almost all post-Soviet regional initiatives have 
been led by regional powers, primarily Russia and China, but with 
sporadic proposals also introduced by the US and the EU. Each of 
these projects explicitly sought to overcome intraregional fractures and 
promote trade, connectivity, and regional integration. They proposed 
alternative mechanisms for increased regional cooperation, however, 
effectively importing a regional identity, a set of norms and values, and 
a particular discourse that corresponded to the identity projection of 
the external partner. As a result, geopolitical projects, far from 
overcoming intraregional divides, have often added a further complex 
layer of fractured relations on top of existing interstate differences. 
The EU promoted regional integration as a central feature of 
successive EU strategies toward Central Asia, effectively mirroring the 
EU’s own identity in its policy toward the region (Boonstra 2015), but 
these regional projects usually failed to achieve their objectives. The 
US initiated the New Silk Road (NSR) project, which sought to build 
on the wider footprint of US power in the region, particularly in 
Afghanistan, to overcome historical fault lines in the wider Central and 
Southern Asian region, and to reconnect disparate political entities into 
a new zone of free trade and connectivity (Kuchins, Sanderson, and 
Gordon 2009; Laruelle 2015c). The idea was first mooted in 2009, 
when the US began using Central Asian transport infrastructure to 
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resupply International Security Assistance Force troops in Afghanistan 
through the Northern Distribution Network. In a 2011 speech in 
Mumbai, US secretary of state Hillary Clinton announced this new 
strategy designed to link Central and South Asia. 
 
Historically, the nations of South and Central Asia were 
connected to each other and the rest of the continent by a 
sprawling trading network called the Silk Road. Indian 
merchants used to trade spices, gems, and textiles, along with 
ideas and culture, everywhere from the Great Wall of China to 
the banks of the Bosphorus. Let’s work together to create a 
new Silk Road. . . . That means building more rail lines, 
highways, energy infrastructure, like the proposed pipeline to 
run from Turkmenistan, through Afghanistan, through 
Pakistan into India. (US Dept of State 2011a) 
 
Clinton’s speech outlined a lost, mythical world along the Silk Road, 
characterized by peaceful trade in goods and ideas, and proposed 
overcoming existing fractures through US-led free trade and 
infrastructure initiatives. While free trade offered an ideological 
panacea to overcome the region’s divisions, US geopolitical goals 
nevertheless reinforced new boundaries, effectively constructing a 
Central Asian region integrated with South Asia, differentiated from 
the former colonial power, Russia. In reality, the discourse of 
connectivity along the NSR was undermined by the reality of 
continued obstacles to trade, including that of corruption, which the 
military Northern Distribution Network appears to have worsened 
rather than improved (Lee 2012, 25). An electricity network promoted 
as part of the NSR—CASA-1000—far from promoting more regional 
integration, threatened to deepen tensions over water and energy use 
between Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. Most significantly, a growing 
strategic interest by the US in the region in the 2000s—and a fear 
among political elites of what were perceived as Western-backed 
“color revolutions” in the neighborhood—stimulated counter projects 
by Russia and China, which intensified geopolitical competition across 
the region.  
Russian-led regional cooperation initiatives in Central Asia 
were complicated by the colonial past and sensitivities about 
sovereignty among Central Asian states. The original post-Soviet 
regional organization set up after the collapse of the USSR—the 
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)—became largely 
moribund by the mid-1990s as it encountered the new sovereignty 
projects of independent post-Soviet states. Instead, selective forms of 
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regional cooperation emerged, first in the security sphere and later in 
trade and economic policy. In security, Russia’s Collective Security 
Treaty Organization (CSTO) brought together Kyrgyzstan, 
Kazakhstan, and Tajikistan (and, until 2012, Uzbekistan) in a security 
pact. However, the CSTO had very limited capacity to address security 
challenges arising from interstate conflicts or from intrastate violence 
(Lewis 2015). A Russian think tank published a report in 2011 calling 
for significant reforms to internal decision-making procedures and for 
capacity to mount peacekeeping-type operations (Yurgens 2011). Yet 
such pragmatic proposals misunderstood the nature of emerging 
Russian policy in the region. The failure to develop the CSTO as an 
effective multilateral regional security organization reflected a very 
different understanding in Moscow of how regional stability should be 
achieved in Central Asia. Rather than prioritizing multilateral 
peacekeeping interventions, Russia preferred to support strong allied 
regimes in the region through bilateral security and military 
relationships. In that sense, the CSTO was not a genuine multilateral 
regional organization but an institutional framework through which 
Russia could pursue bilateral goals. 
Successive regional economic initiatives pursued by Russia in 
the 1990s and 2000s were ineffective. The Eurasian Economic Union 
(EEU), a customs union of five members (Russia, Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Belarus, and Armenia), which began functioning in 2015, 
was a much more ambitious project that adopted technocratic 
functionalist ideas to overcome regional fractures and obstacles to 
regional trade. Technocrats working in its supranational body, the 
Eurasian Economic Commission, in Moscow referenced the 
European Union as their institutional model. However, attempts to 
develop the commission—and a corresponding EEU court in 
Minsk—as autonomous supranational institutions were stymied by the 
unwillingness of individual member states to cede sovereignty and 
their preference for political means to achieve economic goals and to 
resolve cross-border disputes. Moreover, the EEU was characterized 
by a duality between a technocratic project, often supported by liberal 
economists and business (Vieira 2015, 4; Dutkiewicz and Sakwa 2015), 
and a geopolitical project, aimed at asserting Russia’s role both in the 
region and as a pole in a new multipolar global order (International 
Crisis Group 2016a). Within the “technocratic” EEU, borders often 
became easier to negotiate as customs posts were dismantled, but the 
EEU also produced new fractures defined by the boundaries of the 
customs union, at which high trade tariffs and new regulatory barriers 
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were enforced. In this way the EEU also created new barriers to 
cooperation in the region by integrating Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan 
into a Russian-led customs union while Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and 
Turkmenistan remained outside, reflecting a further division across 
Central Asia between states oriented toward Moscow, such as 
Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, and those that sought to maintain more 
distance from Russia (Cooley and Laruelle 2013). 
Abbott Gleason is among many skeptics who argue that “the 
unity of post-Soviet ‘Eurasia’ is fragmentary and fleeting” (Gleason 
2010, 31), and that “the positive, attractive power of a ‘Eurasian idea’ 
under any kind of Russian hegemony is at present negligible” (Gleason 
2010, 32). There is certainly concern in many Central Asian capitals 
about Russian intentions in the region, but attitudes vary by country 
and by social group. There is broad support for close relations with 
Russia among both elites and the wider population in Kyrgyzstan, 
contrasted with very ambivalent and even hostile positions to more 
Russian influence among elites in Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. 
Attitudes toward Eurasian initiatives also vary within societies. Across 
the region, opinion polls—although not always reliable—suggest that 
among all Central Asian societies, regional integration with an 
orientation toward Russia has quite widespread support (International 
Crisis Group 2016a). What this means is more ambiguous, however, 
since the concept of “Eurasia” remains contested and polysemous. 
The EEU asserts a technocratic and institutional meaning for Eurasia, 
but the term is used with many other political, economic, and cultural 
meanings (Laruelle 2015c; Smith and Richardson 2017). For far-right 
Russian nationalists, for example, Eurasia is more ideology than 
geography, a counterhegemonic idea that unites all those opposed to 
an “Atlanticist” liberal international order (Dugin 2014). For 
Kazakhstan, on the other hand, a very different form of Eurasianism 
offers the possibility to enhance cooperation with Russia while 
ensuring national sovereignty and openness to the wider world 
(Kudaibergenova 2016). These diverse meanings have lead some to 
argue that “far from being a significant ideational, geographic, 
economic and strategic space, Eurasia . . . is an incoherent mess of 
spaces” (Smith and Richardson 2017, 5). Yet the contested nature of 
“Eurasia” does not lessen its importance as a geopolitical imaginary. 
The promise of Russian visions of Eurasia to overcome fractures 
within the Central Asian region by redefining it through a close 
relationship with Russia may prove illusory, but the different 
conceptualizations of Eurasia will continue to have profound impacts 
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on geopolitical thinking in the region.  
China’s regional initiatives explicitly reject a concept of divisive 
regionalism, and instead have sought to promote an inclusive vision of 
connectivity, trade, and cooperation. Chinese foreign policy thinking 
claims to overcome conflictual international concepts such as “balance 
of power” or “alliances,” seeking instead “win–win” solutions in a 
harmonious international environment. While Russia’s regional 
initiatives often prioritized spaces and boundaries, China’s initiatives 
have been focused more on the promotion of economic and 
infrastructure links across the region, linking to the global economy, 
rather than promoting a conventional form of regional integration 
(Kaczmarski 2017). Nevertheless, despite an explicit denial of any form 
of regional hegemony, Chinese initiatives are inevitably characterized 
by significant asymmetries of economic power and suggest to some 
the emergence of a new sinocentric form of regional order (Callaghan 
2015). China’s projects in Central Asia have sought to reconstitute the 
region by connecting it to China’s internal efforts to overcome 
domestic divisions and the assertion of a new type of Great Power 
relations in the international system (Godement 2014). 
China’s first attempt to institutionalize its presence in Central 
Asia was through the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, a regional 
security club, which included China, Russia, and four of the five 
Central Asian states (India and Pakistan also joined in 2017). 
Turkmenistan asserted its long-standing policy of neutrality as a 
justification for its unwillingness to enter any regional organizations, 
but that stance did not prevent it from forming an increasingly 
dependent economic relationship with China, which became the main 
buyer for Turkmen gas exports. Tajikistan also developed increasingly 
close economic ties to Beijing, although its reliance on Russia for 
security ties and as a destination for millions of labor migrants ensured 
that relations with Moscow remained critical for the regime. The 
increasing influence of China complicated the geopolitical landscape 
of Central Asia, ensuring that any Russian vision for overcoming 
regional fractures through a renewed model of Moscow-centric 
hegemonic regionalism was unlikely to succeed.  
When Chinese president Xi Jinping announced the Belt and 
Road Initiative (BRI) in 2013, in which Central Asia would play a 
central role, it opened up new possibilities for enhanced Chinese 
influence in the region. The BRI was framed as an international 
extension of the “Chinese Dream,” an idea of a China restored to 
greatness, albeit without threatening any of its neighbors (Callaghan 
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2015). At a work forum on periphery diplomacy in 2013 Xi called for 
diplomacy that would “warm the hearts of others so that neighboring 
countries will become even friendlier” (Heath 2013). The BRI is a 
central initiative in this new regionalism, in which China’s national 
interests are designed to be complemented by the provision of regional 
public goods (Sørensen 2015) The BRI aimed to overcome the 
fractures of disputed borders and complex trade regimes through the 
construction of new Chinese-funded transport infrastructure and 
Chinese support for cross-border trade, improved customs 
procedures, and reduced nontariff barriers. Economic growth and 
cross-border trade was designed to support a zone of “harmonious 
societies,” pro-Chinese regimes in Central Asia along the BRI. By 
opening up trade with Central Asia, Beijing also hoped that the BRI 
would assist in overcoming deep divisions inside China, above all 
between Han Chinese and ethnic Uighurs inside Xinjiang. However, 
the grand aims of the BRI to enhance regional cooperation under the 
aegis of a benevolent Chinese state also risked fueling new fractures in 
society. Growing Chinese influence encountered historical anti-
Chinese sentiment in Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan. Chinese 
investments—particularly plans to lease land to Chinese business—
sparked protests in Kazakhstan in May 2016. Chinese business in 
Kyrgyzstan also faced popular protests and sometimes violent attacks 
(International Crisis Group 2017). Popular opposition was based not 
only on traditional xenophobic attitudes toward a powerful neighbor 
but also on perceptions that Chinese investments involved close 
relations with predatory elites and were often accompanied by 
allegations of high-level corruption and malfeasance. As such, foreign 
investments were frequently portrayed as accentuating already existing 
class cleavages and disparities between rich and poor (International 
Crisis Group 2017).  
Russian and Chinese projects also aimed to prevent Western 
powers from achieving a strategic foothold in the region. Tension with 
US strategic goals has been an inevitable result of both Russian and 
Chinese regional initiatives, although for the most part the US has 
viewed the BRI initiative as less threatening to its interests than Russian 
regional projects. This united stance regarding a Western presence in 
the region has disguised potential tensions between Russian and 
Chinese regional projects in the region. In May 2015 in Moscow, 
Russian president Vladimir Putin and President Xi agreed to 
coordinate the EEU and the BRI, and there were numerous 
subsequent negotiations and meetings, but with few tangible results. 
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This does not mean that cooperation is impossible: both sides 
understand that such talks and agreements effectively paper over 
incompatibilities between the two projects but construct an important 
discourse of cooperation that may make such differences less 
important. 
 
The Eurasian Consensus? Overcoming Fractures through Norms and 
Discourse 
 
These new institutional projects, primarily focused on regional 
economic cooperation, have so far failed to overcome the many 
underlying fractures in the Central Asian region, thereby contributing 
to the conventional argument that the region is fundamentally divided. 
In the realm of ideas and discourse, however, some countervailing 
trends might be identified that nuance or complicate this conclusion. 
An important recent strand in the regionalism literature focused on 
“the shared beliefs, norms and rituals that hold a region together,” the 
intersubjective meanings that together serve to constitute a region and 
underpin a common worldview among states and other regional actors 
(Emerson 2014). Emerson (2014) argues that while military and 
economic power still plays a central role in region building, the 
development of particular regional institutions and practices also 
depends on common understandings or discourse in which actors 
share a common language and ascribe similar meanings to events and 
arrive at a common understanding of the world. In Central Asia, it is 
possible to identify elements of a shared regional discourse that 
comprises a familiar set of illiberal norms, including state-led 
development, the subordination of civil society to the state, a 
valorization of internal and external sovereignty, and the downplaying 
of individual rights in favor of the state. Although there are significant 
differences in political systems across the region, ranging from 
neototalitarianism in Turkmenistan to the laissez-faire semidemocracy 
of Kyrgyzstan, many elements in this political discourse are shared by 
elites across the region. In a neo-Gramscian sense, these ideas form a 
hegemonic discourse in which there is wide agreement on fundamental 
meanings and interpretations of social phenomena, even where there 
is often significant disagreement among actors on specific issues.  
Such an approach suggests that by analyzing common 
discourses among regional elites, we may perceive elements of 
“regionness” even in a region that is otherwise fractured by political, 
economic, and geopolitical divides. Some evidence for such a shared 
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set of norms can be found in the founding documents and texts of 
regional organizations, such as the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization (SCO), which promote a shared set of norms at odds 
with the liberal principles promoted by Western states and 
organizations, such as the Organization for Security and Cooperation 
in Europe (Lewis 2012). Ambrosio (2008) argued that a “Shanghai 
spirit” discourse was promoted through the SCO as a framework for 
a process of norm promotion by China across the region. China used 
the language of the “three evils” (terrorism, religious extremism, and 
separatism) and has seen them reproduced in regional forums and 
official discourse. This discursive formula is repeated in speeches at 
successive SCO summit meetings but also circulates within member 
states. For example, in February 2013 the antiterrorism center of the 
State Committee for National Security of Kyrgyzstan echoed this SCO 
trope when it announced “it [would] hold explanatory work in 
government agencies and other interested agencies on threats of 
international terrorism, religious extremism and separatism in 
Kyrgyzstan and Central Asia” (Kabar 2013). In this way, contested 
concepts such as “self-determination” or “minority rights” are given 
shared meanings that become institutionalized through regional 
organizations and bilateral relationships and become accepted as 
“common sense” by regional elites. 
One version of this argument is the attempt by Filippo Costa-
Buranelli (2014a, 2014b) to explain Central Asian regional politics 
through a reworking of English school theories of international 
relations, which argue that even in an anarchical international order, 
states can form an international society based on observance of some 
common norms and institutions. A rescaling of English school ideas 
to the regional level opens up a perspective that emphasizes 
cooperation among Central Asian states, rather than division. An 
analysis of voting patterns and speeches by Central Asian 
representatives at the UN, for example, demonstrates that they share 
common positions in many debates on the interpretation of 
international norms in ways that belie their regional divisions (Costa-
Buranelli 2014b). This idea of an evolving set of shared norms is more 
nuanced than notions of “autocracy promotion,” which suggest a 
conscious, linear process of learning, testing, and adopting particular 
policy ideas from external actors (for discussion, see Ambrosio 2010; 
Burnell and Schlumberger 2010; Bader 2015; Tansey 2016). Instead, 
the emergence of a common discourse that references a common set 
of agreed meanings and interpretations of reality comes through 
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constant processes of social interaction influenced by preexisting 
historical, cultural, and social norms and practices. 
This shared discourse has important consequences for our 
understanding of a fractured region. First, it partly explains why—
despite fundamental fractures between and within states—armed 
conflict has been relatively rare in the Central Asian region. Second, 
this intersubjective agreement among actors offers an explanation for 
the ability of certain hegemons to assert their influence in the region 
effectively while others are sidelined or marginalized. Russian and 
Chinese influence in the region is not only the result of security support 
or economic assistance but also reflects their ability to share normative 
understandings with states in the region, which are intensified by 
regular institutional exchange in forums such as the SCO or other 
multilateral formats. Western attempts to gain traction in the region, 
on the other hand, have been hampered not only by limited funding 
and a lack of political commitment but by the absence of a shared set 
of norms that would underpin broader cooperation. Third, shared 
discourses permit configurations of geopolitical power that might 
appear paradoxical when viewed through a neorealist lens. As 
discussed earlier, the prospects for Sino-Russian relations are often 
viewed negatively when analysts focus on strategic political or 
economic interests. But agreement by both powers on the wider 
normative landscape provides a basis for their ongoing cooperation in 
the region (Wishnick 2016). 
 
Conclusion 
 
Central Asia remains a deeply fractured region, lacking the most 
obvious attributes of the new regionalism such as effective regional 
associations, civil society links, or extensive business cooperation and 
intraregional trade. Despite these deep fault lines, a multilayered 
approach to regional fracture suggests that a focus primarily on 
evidence of regional fracture threatens to overlook important areas of 
agreement, particularly those evident in the area of norms, ideas, and 
interpretations of the world. Despite personal, political, and economic 
differences, regional leaders often share a common discourse and view 
the world in similar ways. External powers such as China have 
introduced new normative content into this shared discourse but 
without significant resistance since their ideas tend to overlap with 
existing concepts of the nature of the state and its role in relation to 
society. Even more evident is the extent to which contemporary 
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Russian models of political and economic order, which emphasis 
counterrevolutionary ideologies and conservative norms, have become 
central to ideological and political thought across the region. These 
illiberal ideas, rather than being imposed from outside, have evolved 
organically through a constant process of discursive interaction among 
elites in the region. Many of the forums and institutions that served as 
the platforms for this normative and discursive agreement were 
dismissed by Western analysts as ineffectual “talking shops.” In reality, 
it may turn out that this role—as discursive forums—served a critical 
function in developing a shared regional discourse based not on liberal 
norms or the tenets of the new regionalism but on authoritarian and 
illiberal ideas of political and social order. Despite the continuing 
salience of serious political, social, and economic fractures in the 
region, agreement among elites on shared norms has begun to provide 
a framework for the emergence of new forms of “illiberal” regionalism 
in Central Asia.  
 
 
